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Abstract—In this paper, the delay limited secrecy capacity of
the flat fading channel is investigated under two different as-
sumptions on the available transmitter channel state information
(CSI). The first scenario assumes perfect prior knowledge of
both the main and eavesdropper channel gains. Here, upper and
lower bounds on the secure delay limited capacity are derived
and shown to be tight in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
regime (for a wide class of channel distributions). In the second
scenario, only the main channel CSI is assumed to be available at
the transmitter. Remarkably, under this assumption, we establish
the achievability of non-zero secure rate (for a wide class of
channel distributions) under a strict delay constraint. In the two
cases, our achievability arguments are based on a novel two-
stage approach that overcomes the secrecy outage phenomenon
observed in earlier works.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many applications, there is a delay constraint on the
data to be transmitted via a wireless link. These applica-
tions range from the most basic voice communication to
the more demanding multimedia streaming. However, due
to its broadcast nature, the wireless channel is vulnerable
to eavesdropping and other security threats. Therefore, it is
of critical importance to find techniques to combat these
security attacks while satisfying the delay limitation imposed
by the Quality of Service (QoS) constraints. This motivates
our analysis of the fundamental information theoretic limits
of secure transmission over fading channels subject to strict
deadlines.
Recent works on information theoretic security have been
largely motivated by Wyner’s wire-tap channel model [1]. In
his seminal work, Wyner proved the achievability of non-zero
secrecy capacity, assuming that the wiretapper channel is a
degraded version of the main one, by exploiting the noise to
create an advantage for the legitimate receiver. The effect of
fading on the secrecy capacity was further studied in [2] in
the ergodic setting. The main insight offered by this work is
that one can opportunistically exploit the fading to achieve a
non-zero secrecy capacity even if the eavesdropper channel is
better than the legitimate receiver channel, on the average.
Delay limited transmission over fading channels has been
well studied in different network settings and using various
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traffic models. For example, in [3], the delay limited capacity
notion was introduced and the optimal power control policies
were characterized in several interesting scenarios. In [4], the
strict delay limitation of [3] was relaxed by allowing for
buffering the packets at the transmitter. In this setup, the
asymptotic behavior of the power-delay trade-off curve was
characterized yielding valuable insights on the structure of the
optimal resource allocation strategies [4]. More recently, the
scheduling problem of data transmission over a finite delay
horizon assuming perfect CSI was considered in [5]. Our work
can be viewed as a generalization of [3] where a secrecy
constraint is imposed on the problem. The extension to the
bursty traffic scenario is currently under investigation.
The delay limited transmission of secure data over fading
channels was considered previously in [8]. In this work,
the authors attempted to send the secure information using
binning techniques inspired by the wiretap channel results.
The drawback of this approach is that it fails to secure the
information in the particular instants where the eavesdropper
channel gain is larger than that of the main channel resulting
in the so-called secrecy outage phenomenon (as defined in
[8]). Unfortunately, in the delay limited setting, the secrecy
outage can not made to vanish by increasing the block length
leading to the conclusion that the delay limited rate achieved
by this approach is equal to zero for most channel distributions
of interest [8]. This obstacle is overcome by our two-stage
approach. Here, the delay sensitive data of the current block
is secured via Vernam’s one time pad approach [6], which was
proved to achieve perfect secrecy by Shannon [7], where the
legitimate nodes agree on the private key during the previous
blocks. Since the key packets are not delay sensitive, the
two nodes can share the key by distributing its bits over
many fading realizations to capitalize on the ergodic behavior
of the channel. Through the appropriate rate allocation, the
key bits can be superimposed on the delay sensitive data
packets so that they can be used for securing future packets.
This is referred as key renewal process in the sequel. This
process requires an initialization phase to share the key needed
for securing the first data packets. However, the loss in the
secrecy entailed by the initialization overhead vanishes in
the asymptotic limit of a large number of data packets. Our
analytical results establish the asymptotic optimality, with high
SNR, of this novel approach in the scenario where both the
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Fig. 1. System Model
main and eavesdropper channel gains are known a-priori at the
transmitter (for a wide class of channel distributions). When
only the main channel CSI is available, this approach is shown
to achieve a non-zero constant secrecy rate for a wide class of
quasi-static channels (i.e., the class of invertible channels [3]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
details the system model and the notations used throughout
the rest of the paper. In Section III, our main results for both
the full and main CSI cases are obtained. Finally, Section IV
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is as shown in Figure 1. A source node
(Alice) communicates with a destination node (Bob) over a
fading channel in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). We
adopt a block fading model, in which the channel is assumed to
be constant during a coherence interval and changes randomly
from an interval to another according to a bounded continuous
distribution. Also the coherent intervals are assumed to be
large enough to allow for the use of random coding techniques.
During any coherence symbol interval i, the signals received
at the destination and the eavesdropper are given by
y(i) = gm(i)x(i) + wm(i), (1)
z(i) = ge(i)x(i) + we(i), (2)
where x(i) is the transmitted symbol, gm(i) and ge(i) are the
main channel and the eavesdropper channel gains respectively,
wm(i) and we(i) are the i.i.d. additive white complex gaussian
noise with unit variance at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, respectively. We denote the power gains of the
fading channels for the main and eavesdropper channels by
hm(i) = |gm(i)|2 and he(i) = |ge(i)|2, respectively. We
impose the long term average power constraint P¯ , i.e.,
E[P (h)] ≤ P¯ , (3)
where P (h) is the power allocated for the channel state h =
(hm, he) and the expectation is over the channel gains.
The source wishes to send a message W ∈ W =
{1, 2, · · · ,M} to the destination. In the following, our delay
constraint is imposed by breaking our message into packets
of equal sizes, where each one is encoded independently,
transmitted in only one coherence block, and decoded by
the main receiver at the end of this block. Accordingly, the
total number of channel uses is partitioned into b super-blocks.
Each super-block is divided into a blocks of n1 symbols,
where n = b a n1 and n1 denotes the length of coherence
intervals. We will further represent a fading block with tuple
(m, l) such that m ∈ {1, 2, · · · , b} and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , a}.
We consider the problem of constructing (M1, n1) codes
(M = b a M1) to transmit the message of the block (m, l),
W (m, l) ∈ W1 = {1, 2, . . . ,M1} to the receiver. Here,
an (M1, n1) code consists of the following elements: 1) a
stochastic encoder fn1(.) at the source that maps the message
w(m, l) to a codeword xn1(m, l) ∈ Xn1 , and 2) a decoding
function φ: Yn∗ → W1 at the legitimate receiver, where
n∗ = (m − 1)an1 + ln1 denotes the total number received
signal dimension at the receiver at the end of the block (m, l).
The average error probability of an (M1, n1) code is defined
as
Pn1e =
1
M1
∑
w∈W1
Pr(φ(yn
∗
) 6= w|w was sent),
where yn∗ represents the total received signals at the legitimate
receiver at the end of the block (m, l). The equivocation rate
Re at the eavesdropper is defined as the entropy rate of the
transmitted message conditioned on the available CSI and the
channel outputs at the eavesdropper, i.e.,
Re
∆
=
1
n
H(W |Zn, hnm, h
n
e ), (4)
where hnm = {hm(1), · · · , hm(n)} and hne =
{he(1), · · · , he(n)} denote the channel power gains of
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper in n symbol
intervals, respectively. We consider only the perfect secrecy
(in the sense of [1]) which requires the equivocation rate Re
to be ǫ close to the message rate. The delay limited perfect
secrecy rate Rs,d is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0,
there exists a sequence of codes (2n1Rs,d , n1) such that for
any n1 ≥ n1(ǫ), we have
Pn1e ≤ ǫ
Re ≥ Rs,d − ǫ
for any fading block (m, l).
Finally, we give some notational remarks. We denote the
delay limited secrecy rate and capacity as R(F )s,d and C
(F )
s,d
for the full CSI case (both gm and ge are known a-priori
at the transmitter). We respectively use the notation R(M)s,d
and C(M)s,d for the main CSI case (only gm is known a-priori
at the transmitter). We denote [x]+ = max{x, 0}. And, we
remark that the expectations are with respect to channel gains
throughout the sequel.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Full CSI Scenario
First, we give a simple upper bound on the delay limited
secrecy capacity that will be used later to establish the opti-
mality of the proposed approach in the high SNR regime.
Theorem 1: The delay-limited secrecy capacity when both
gm and ge are available at the transmitter, C(F )s,d , is upper
bounded by
C
(F )
s,d ≤ max
P (h)
s.t. E[P(h)]≤P¯
min
{
R(F )s , R
(F )
d
}
, (5)
where R(F )s and R(F )d are given as follows.
R(F )s = E [log(1 + P (h)hm)− log(1 + P (h)he)]
+
R
(F )
d = min
h
log(1 + P (h)hm)
Proof: For a given power allocation scheme P (h), we
have
R
(F )
s,d ≤ R
(F )
s , (6)
for any achievable delay limited secrecy rate R(F )s,d , since
imposing delay constraint can only degrade the performance.
We also have, for a given P (h),
R
(F )
s,d ≤ R
(F )
d , (7)
since imposing secrecy constraint can not increase the achiev-
able rate. Then, combining (6) and (7), and maximizing over
P (h), we obtain
R
(F )
s,d
≤ max
P (h)
min{R
(F )
d
, R(F )s }, (8)
for any achievable delay-limited secrecy rate R(F )s,d , which
proves our result.
The following result establishes a lower bound on the delay
limited secrecy capacity using our novel two-stage approach.
The key idea is to share a private key between Alice and Bob,
without being constrained by the delay limitation. Then, this
key is used to secure the delay sensitive data to overcome
the secrecy outage phenomenon. In the steady state, the key
renewal process takes place by superimposing the key on the
delay sensitive traffic. More precisely, as outlined in the proof,
the delay sensitive traffic (secured by the previous key) serves
as a randomization signal in the binning scheme used to secure
the current key. Finally, since he is known a-priori at the
transmitter, one can further increase the delay limited secrecy
rate by dedicating a portion of the secure rate to the delay
sensitive traffic (as controlled by the function q(h) in the
following theorem).
Theorem 2: The delay-limited secrecy capacity in the full
CSI scenario is lower bounded as follows.
C
(F )
s,d ≥ R
(F )
s,d = max
P (h), q(h)
s.t. E[P(h)]≤P¯
[
min
h
{R′′s (h) +Ro(h)}
]
, (9)
where
R′′s (h) = Rs(h) −R
′
s(h),
Rs(h) = [log(1 + P (h)hm)− log(1 + P (h)he)]
+
,
R′s(h) = [log(1 + P (h)hm)− log(1 + P (h)q(h))]
+,
such that q(h) is an arbitrary chosen function satisfying
q(h) ≥ he ∀ he, and Ro is chosen to satisfy the followings.
E[Ro(h)] ≤ E[R
′
s(h)]
Ro(h) ≤ min {log(1 + P (h)hm), log(1 + P (h)he)} (10)
Sketch of the Proof: In our scheme, we require Alice to
transmit a delay constrained data message and a key to Bob.
The key is used to encrypt data and thus should be secured
from Eve. A given message w ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2(n(R
(F )
s,d
))} is
transmitted by sending ba data packets of equal length, each
represented by D(m, l), where each packet is encoded inde-
pendently and sent with rate R(F )s,d during the corresponding
block of the channel. We further divide a packet to be trans-
mitted at block (m, l) into two parts D1(m, l) and D2(m, l).
The first part of data packet is transmitted along with the
generated key using the one-time pad scheme, whereas the
second part is transmitted as a secret message. We use a
separation strategy similar to [9] by sending public and private
messages simultaneously. But, in contrast to [9], we here have
the fading channel as the resource from Alice to Bob and Eve
and we exploit it to secure the key, and hence, the message. We
now describe the initial key generation and key renewal. For
the very first a blocks (the super-blockm = 1), we transmit the
key, K(1), from Alice to Bob securely. Utilizing the ergodicity
of the channel, we can transmit a key of length an1E[R′s(h)]
bits [2]. Then, for any super-block m, we will use the key
K(m− 1) for the one time pad, and also generate a new key
K(m) for the use in the next super-block. For any given block
(m, l), we use the n1Ro(h) remaining bits of the key K(m−1)
and denote the corresponding bits as K˜(m, l). These bits
are used in a one-time pad scheme to construct Do(m, l) =
D1(m, l) ⊕ K˜(m, l). The encrypted bits are then mapped to
a message w1(m, l) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2n1Ro(h)}. The message w1
along with a possible additional randomization is transmitted
along with the secret data. Here, the secret data we sent within
a block is two-fold: w2(m, l) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2(n1R
′′
s (h))} which
carries the corresponding data D2(m, l) and the key message
wk(m, l) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2(n1R
′
s(h))}. These latter messages will
allow us to generate the key K(m) of the super block m.
Since b → ∞, a → ∞, n1 → ∞, it can be easily shown
that the rates Ro(h), R′s(h), and R′′s (h) are achievable within
a given block. Furthermore, the average key rate, E[R′s(h)],
is achievable within any super-block (see, e.g., [2]).
We finally argue that the equivocation rate at the eavesdrop-
per can be made arbitrarily close to the message rate with the
proposed scheme. Here, we consider equivocation computation
per block, which will imply the equivocation computation for
the overall message. For a given block (m, l), the security of
w1(m, l) follows from the one-time pad encryption (as the
key is secured from the eavesdropper [7]) and the security of
w2(m, l) follows from the wire-tap channel result along with
the secure rate choice R′s(h) and R′′s (h) [1]. We note that
during the first super-block w1(1, l) is not encrypted. However,
this will not affect the overall secrecy of the data as b→∞.
Hence, the equivocation rate can be made close to the message
rate as b→∞, a→∞, and n1 →∞.
The achievable rate is then minimized over h to satisfy the
delay limitation and then maximized over all power control
policies and functions q(h) (used to allocate rate for w2). This
proves the desired result.
The final step in this section is to prove the asymptotic
optimality of the proposed security scheme in the high SNR
regime. The following result establishes this objective by
showing that the upper and lower bounds of Theorems 1 and 2
match in this asymptotic scenario.
Lemma 3: In an asymptotic regime of high SNR, i.e., P¯ →
∞, the delay limited secrecy capacity is given by
lim
P¯→∞
C
(F )
s,d = Ehm>he
[
log
(
hm
he
)]
, (11)
assuming that E
[
1
min(he,hm)
]
is finite. Moreover, the capacity
is achieved by the proposed one-time pad encryption scheme
coupled with the key renewal process.
Proof: We only need to consider the lower bound since
the right hand side of (11) is the ergodic secrecy capacity
in the high SNR regime, which is by definition an upper
bound on the delay limited secrecy capacity. To this end, we
set q(h) = he resulting in R′′s (h) = 0. Furthermore, we let
P (h) = cmin(he,hm) , where c is a constant, which is chosen
according to the average power constraint. The achievable rate
expression in the high SNR regime is then given by
lim
P¯→∞
R
(F )
s,d = lim
P¯→∞
min
h
Ro(h), (12)
where Ro(h) is chosen to satisfy
E[Ro(h)] ≤ E[log(1 + P (h)hm)− log(1 + P (h)he)]
+]
Ro(h) ≤ log(1 + c) (13)
As P¯ → ∞, it is easy to see that c → ∞ since
E
[
1
min(he,hm)
]
is finite, implying that the second constraint
in (13) is loose. Also, it is easy to see that the first constraint
converges to the right hand side of the lemma. Then, by
choosing Ro(h) = Ehm>he
[
log
(
hm
he
)]
, both constraints of
(13) are satisfied and our result is proved.
The above claim is validated numerically in Fig. 2, where
Chi-square distribution of degree n = 4 is used for the
statistics of channel gains of the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper (the gains are assumed to be independent). In
our simulation, we set q(h) = he (hence R′′s = 0) and use
channel inversion power control policy for the achievable rate.
Remarkably, even with the suboptimal choice of q(h) and
P (h), lower and upper bounds coincides at the high SNR
regime.
B. Only Main Channel CSI Scenario
In this section we assume that only the legitimate receiver
CSI is available at the transmitter. First, we have the following
upper bound.
Theorem 4: The delay-limited secrecy capacity when only
the legitimate receiver channel state is available at the trans-
mitter, C(M)s,d , is upper bounded by
C
(M)
s,d ≤ max
P (hm)
s.t. E[P(hm)]≤P¯
min
{
R(M)s , R
(M)
d
}
(14)
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Fig. 2. Simulation results for the full CSI case
where R(M)s and R(M)d are given as follows.
R(M)s = E [log(1 + P (hm)hm)− log(1 + P (hm)he)]
+
R
(M)
d = min
hm
log(1 + P (hm)hm)
Proof: The proof follows the same argument as that of
Theorem 1 with the power control policy P (hm).
The achievability scheme in this scenario is different from
the previous scenario in two key aspects: 1) the lack of knowl-
edge about he forces us to secure the whole delay sensitive
traffic with the one time pad approach (i.e., setting the rate
of w2 to zero) to overcome the secrecy outage phenomenon
and 2) the binning scheme of the key renewal process must
now operate on the level of the super-block to average-out
the fluctuations in he. On the other hand, the delay sensitive
packet must be decoded after each block which makes it more
challenging to use it as a randomization for hiding the key. The
achievable rate reported in the following result is obtained by
superimposing the binning scheme used in [2], to achieve the
ergodic secrecy rate for the key, on the delay limited traffic
(secured by the key bits sent in the previous super-blocks).
Theorem 5: The delay-limited secrecy capacity in the only
main CSI scenario is lower bounded as follows.
C
(M)
s,d ≥ R
(M)
s,d = max
P(hm)
s.t. E[P(hm)]≤P¯
min
{
Rs, R
(M)
d
}
, (15)
where Rs and R(M)d are given as follows.
Rs = E[log(1 + P (hm)hm)−R
(M)
s,d − log(1 + P (hm)he)]
+
R
(M)
d = min
hm
log(1 + P (hm)hm)
Sketch of the Proof: First, fix a power control policy
P (hm). We then divide the channel uses into super-blocks
and further divide each super-block into blocks as done in the
proof of Theorem 2. In this scenario, we utilize the achievable
secure rate within a block only for the key generation. That is,
data is transmitted using only the one-time pad encryption in
contrast to the scheme used in Theorem 2. More specifically,
the key is decoded at the end of each super-block whereas the
data packets are still decoded block by block using the key
sent in the previous super-block.
A given message w ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
(M)
s,d }, is divided into
ba data packets, each represented by D(m, l), where each
packet is sent with rate R(M)s,d during the corresponding block
of the channel. The data packet D(m, l) is transmitted along
with the generated key using the one-time pad scheme. Initial
key generation and key renewal is similar to the scheme in
Theorem 2. For any super-block m, we use the key K(m−1)
for the one-time pad, and also generate a new key K(m) for
the use in the next super-block.
For any given block (m, l), we use the n1R(M)s,d remaining
bits from the key K(m − 1) and denote corresponding bits
as K˜(m, l), where we set K(0) = ∅. These bits are used in
a one-time pad scheme to construct Do(m, l) = D(m, l) ⊕
K˜(m, l). The encrypted bits are then mapped to a message
w(m, l) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2n1R
(M)
s,d }. At this point, we choose the
rate of this message to satisfy R(M)s,d ≤ R
(M)
d to allow a fixed
rate transmission for every fading state, i.e., to satisfy the delay
limitation. For the key renewal process, the binning scheme is
constructed as in the achievable scheme used in [2]. The output
bits are then grouped in blocks with rates given by log(1 +
P (hm)hm)−R
(M)
s,d . We then combine those bits with the R
(M)
s,d
reserved for the encrypted data packet and encode them using
a capacity achieving codebook (for the main channel). Each
codeword is decoded at the end of the block releasing the delay
sensitive packet. In order to decode the key bits, on the other
hand, one must wait till the end of the binning codeword (i.e.,
a super-block). Following the argument given in [2], one can
see that the following key rate can be achieved with perfect
secrecy (as b→∞, a→∞, and n1 →∞).
Rs = E[log(1 + P (hm)hm)−R
(M)
s,d − log(1 + P (hm)he)]
+.
Therefore, if R(M)s,d is chosen as in the theorem, there will be
enough key bits to encrypt the message of the following block.
Similar to Theorem 2, the un-encrypted messages during the
very first block becomes negligible as b → ∞, and the
secrecy requirement can be satisfied. The achievable rate is
then maximized over all power control policies satisfying the
average power constraint to obtain the desired result.
Interestingly, one can easily verify that for a wide class of
invertible channels (i.e., E
(
1
hm
)
is finite), the rate R(M)
s,d
is
non-zero. Numerical results are provided in Fig. 3, where Chi-
square distribution of degree n = 4 is used for the channel
gains. Here, channel inversion power control policy is used for
both the upper and lower bounds. The non-zero delay limited
rate is evident in the figure.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have studied the delay-limited secrecy capacity of the
slow-fading channel under different assumptions on the CSI
at the transmitter. Our achievability arguments are based on
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Fig. 3. Simulation results for the main CSI case.
a novel two-stage scheme that allows for overcoming the
secrecy outage phenomenon for a wide class of channels. The
scheme is based on sharing a delay tolerant private key, using
random binning, and then using the key to encrypt the the
delay sensitive packets in a one time pad format. For the full
CSI case, our scheme is further shown to be asymptotically
optimal, i.e., high SNR regime, for many relevant channel
distributions. When only the main channel CSI is available,
the two-stage scheme achieves a non-zero secure rate, under
a strict delay constraint, for invertible channels. Finally, one
can easily identify avenues for future works; three of them are
immediate, namely 1) obtaining sharp capacity results for finite
values of SNR, 2) characterizing the optimal power control
policies, and 3) extending the framework to bursty traffic by
allowing for buffer delays.
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